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Professional Trade Names:
Unprotected Commercial Speech
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."' This man-
date applies with equal force to the states through operation of the
fourteenth amendment.2 Although this regulatory restriction ap-
pears on its face to be an absolute prohibition, the Supreme Court
has always considered some regulation of speech necessary and
desirable.3 For instance, speech is not protected when it consists
of fighting words,4 or when it is obscene,5 libelous,6 or part of the
commission of an illegal act.7 Commercial speech, or speech that
does "no more than propose a commercial transaction,"8 was also
considered unprotected at one time,9 but recent Supreme Court
decisions indicate a change in attitude, reinforcing the opinion that
some first amendment protections extend to the "free flow of com-
mercial information."'1
In Friedman v. Rogers," the Supreme Court was again
presented with an opportunity to address the issue of commercial
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. E.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925).
3. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961); Hunter, Prescription Drugs
and Open Housing: More on Commercial Speech, 25 EMORY L.J. 815, 818
(1976).
4. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
5. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
6. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
7. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
8. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973).
9. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
10. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
11. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
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speech. A Texas statute prohibiting optometrists from practicing
under trade names 12 was challenged as an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of the freedom of speech. Employing a first amendment
analysis focusing on the elements of commercial speech, the Court
upheld the restriction on trade name 13 usage, finding that the
Texas statute was a constitutionally permissible state regulation in
furtherance of protecting the public from possible deceptive and
misleading trade practices.1 4 This note will address the first
12. The statute under scrutiny by the Court, a portion of the Texas Optometry
Act of 1969, provides that "[n] o optometrist shall practice or continue to prac-
tice optometry under, or use in connection with his practice of optometry,
any assumed name, corporate name, trade name, or any name other than the
name under which he is licensed to practice optometry in Texas. . . ." TEx.
REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4552 § 5.13(d) (Vernon 1976).
Twenty-two other states have codified similar restriction on the practice of
optometry. ALA. CODE § 22-23(11) (1977); Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1755
(1976); HAWAn REV. STAT. § 459-9(9) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 54-1510(2) (1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 3814(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 154.4 (West 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1510(a) (Supp. 1979); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 320.300(5) (Baldwin 1977); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 72 (West
1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 336.110(6) (Vernon Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 66-1302(f) (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 636.350 (1975); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 67-1-11(D) (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-125 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
59, § 585(e) (West Supp. 1979-80); OR. RE V. STAT. § 683.180(5) (1977); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 63-822(f) (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-16-14(6) (1974); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1695(a) (1975); VA. CODE § 54-388(A) (2) (g) (Supp. 1979);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.53.140(5) (1978); W. VA. CODE § 30-8-8 (1976). See
also CAl. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3125 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24
§ 2113(a) (7) (f) (Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45: 12-11(i) (2) (West 1978).
The State of Nebraska places no such restrictions on the practice of optome-
try. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-1,133 to -1,136.08 (Reissue 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
13. A trade name is any designation which
(a) is adopted and used by a person to denominate goods which he
markets or services which he renders or a business which he con-
ducts, or has come to be so used by others, and
(b) through its association with such goods, services or business,
has acquired a special significance as the name thereof, and
(c) the use of which for the purpose stated in Clause (a) is prohib-
ited neither by a legislative enactment nor by an otherwise defined
public policy.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716 (1938). This definition has been adopted, at
least in part, by several courts. See, e.g., In re Oldtowne Legal Clinic, PA., 285
Md. 132,-, 400 A.2d 1111, 1114 (1979); Walters v. Building Maintenance Serv.,
Inc., 291 S.W.2d 377, 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
A trade name should not be confused with a trademark. Generally, the
following distinction has been made: "A 'trade-name' relates to the business
and its good will as contrasted with a 'trademark' which attaches to a vendi-
ble commodity or service as a guaranty of quality." Balesteri v. Holler, 87 Cal.
App. 3d 717, 721, 151 Cal. Rptr. 229, 232 (1978). Accord, American Steel Foun-
dries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926).
14. The Court also unanimously upheld another section of the Texas statutes
under an equal protection analysis. That section provides that "[alt all times
there shall be a minimum of two thirds of the [Texas Optometry] [B] oard
1980]
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amendment issues raised in Friedman, trace the development of
commercial speech protection and examine the justifications of-
fered by the Court for its holding that optometrical trade names
are unprotected commercial speech.
II. THE FACTS
The dispute in Friedman grew out of a difference of opinion be-
tween "professional" and "commercial" optometrists. 15 In Texas,
as throughout much of the nation, those who refer to themselves
as "professional" optometrists oppose the use of any advertising or
promotional practices in optometry. "Commercial" optometrists,
on the other hand, favor a more businesslike approach to the prac-
tice of optometry and advocate the use of trade names, advertising
and similar practice. The Texas Optometry Act,16 enacted in 1969,
was a legislative effort to resolve the controversy between these
conflicting viewpoints. 17 A six-member Texas Optometry Board
who are members of a state optometric association which is recognized by
and affiliated with the American Optometric Association." TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4552 § 2.02 (Vernon 1976). The code of ethics of the American
Optometric Association and its Texas affiliate, the Texas Optometric Associa-
tion, prohibits the use of trade names by their members. "Commercial op-
tometrists," or optometrists who employ commercial practices including the
use of trade names, are ineligible for membership in these "Professional" op-
tometric organizations, and are therefore precluded by section 2.02 from ob-
taining four of the six positions on the Texas Optometry Board.
The basis of the commercial optometrists' claim was that section 2.02 de-
prived them of equal protection because they were regulated by a board con-
trolled by a faction of the profession to which they did not belong. The Court
rejected this argument, holding that since section 2.02 is "related reasonably
to the State's legitimate purpose of securing a Board that will administer the
[Texas Optometry] Act faithfully," 440 U.S. at 17, it does not violate the equal
protection rights of commercial optometrists.
15. Optometrists are licensed practitioners who specialize in problems
of human vision. They perform eye examinations and are able to
prescribe and adapt lenses or or [sic] other optical aids to preserve
or restore maximum visual efficiency. They are trained to detect eye
diseases, but are not permitted to make definite diagnoses, perform
surgery or prescribe drugs.
43 Fed. Reg. 23,992 to 23,993 (1978) (footnote omitted).
The differences between optometrists, ophthalmologists and opticians
have often caused confusion. The Supreme Court, in Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486 (1955), distinguished them in the fol-
lowing manner.
An ophthalmologist is a duly licensed physician who specializes in
the care of the eyes. An optometrist examines eyes for refractive er-
ror, recognizes (but does not treat) diseases of the eye, and fills pre-
scriptions for eyeglasses. The optician is an artisan qualified to grind
lenses, fill prescriptions, and fit frames.
16. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4552 §§ 1.01-6.04 (Vernon 1976).
17. No matter which of these business methods an optometrist chooses to adopt,
[Vol. 59:482
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was created to administer the Act.18 The Act prescribes the qualifi-
cations and responsibilities for Board members and imposes nu-
merous regulations on the practice and business aspects of
optometry in Texas.19
Friedman addressed the first amendment issues arising from
Texas' prohibition of the use of trade names in the practice of op-
tometry.2 0 Dr. N. Jay Rogers, an advocate of the commercial prac-
tice of optometry and a member of the Texas Optometry Board,21
was a leading spokesman for the over 100 commercial optometry
offices in Texas. Offices affiliated with Rogers' organization oper-
ated under the trade name "Texas State Optical," or "TSO. '22 Rog-
ers owned some Texas State Optical offices; in others he was
merely a partner. Furthermore, in other offices he had no financial
interest other than licensing the Texas State Optical trade name
and selling optical supplies and services to the associated optome-
trist.23 In 1975, he commenced an action against the other five
members of the Board seeking relief against restrictions on the use
of a trade name under section 5.13(d) of the Act.24
The district court used two closely related arguments to justify
the inclusion of trade names within the protection of the first
amendment.25 First, the court held that because a trade name calls
public attention to a product or service, it is "advertising," and
the standards for licensing and practice in Texas are uniformly high. See id.
§§ 3.02, .05, 4.01B.
18. Id. § 2.01.
19. Id. §§ 2.02, 4.04, 5.01, .04, .06, 5.09 to .16.
20. Id. § 5.13(d). Prior to the enactment of the Texas Optometry Act, a prohibi-
tion against the use of trade names had been adopted by the Texas State
Board of Examiners in Optometry in 1959, as part of that Board's "Profes-
sional Responsibility Rule." With only minor changes, this Professional Re-
sponsibility Rule was incorporated into the 1969 Texas Optometry Act as
section 5.13(a)-(k). The stated purpose of section 5.13(a)-(k) is "to protect
the public in the practice of optometry, better enable members of the public
to fix professional responsibility, and further safeguard the doctor-patient re-
lationship." TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552 § 5.13(a) (Vernon 1976).
21. Rogers had been a licensed optometrist in Texas since 1939 and a member of
the Texas Optometry Board since 1955. Brief for Appellee at 5, Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
22. A grandfather provision in the Texas Optometry Act permitted the temporary
use of trade names by some offices after 1969. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4552 § 5.13(k) (Vernon 1976).
23. 440 U.S. at 21 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although Rogers may not have
been in financial control of an office, the use of the Texas State Optical trade
name was conditioned by a contract which specified that the office would be
operated in accord with Texas State Optical policy and all optical materials
would be purchased from the Rogers Brothers Laboratory. See Record at 71,
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (McGuire contract).
24. See note 12 supra.
25. Rogers v. Friedman, 438 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Tex. 1977).
1980]
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comes within the rationale which gives advertising by profession-
als first amendment protection. Second, the court stated that even
if a trade name is not considered advertising per se, a first amend-
ment right exists to use such a name as part of the consuming pub-
lic's right to valuable information. Relying almost exclusively on
the rationale of the Supreme Court's recent advertising cases,26
the district court then applied a first amendment balancing of in-
terests and held that the state's "blanket suppression of the use of
trade names results in unwarranted restriction of the free flow of
commercial information and therefore represents an unconstitu-
tional violation of the first amendment. '27 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed.
The Supreme Court differed fundamentally from the district
court's view that a trade name is not deceptive in nature. The
Court believed that because the associations of a trade name with
the price and quality of the services and products it represents
were ill-defined, a significant possibility existed that trade names
could be used to mislead the public. Therefore, section 5.13(d) was
upheld as a constitutionally permissible state regulation of decep-
tive and misleading commercial speech.
II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE SUPREME COURT28
Until recently, it had been widely accepted that commercial
26. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
27. 438 F. Supp. at 431 (footnote omitted). The court noted, with a general refer-
ence to Bates, that it was specifically rejecting the contention that the Texas
State Optical name misleads the public as to who is the responsible optome-
trist.
The district court also addressed the constitutionality of other sections of
the Texas Optometry Act. Section 5.09(a), prohibiting price advertising of
ophthalmic services and products by optometrists, was held violative of the
first amendment in light of the recent Supreme Court advertising decisions.
Section 5.15(e), regulating the referral of patients by optometrists to opti-
cians, was upheld since its effect was found to encourage the free flow of com-
mercial speech to consumers. Section 2.02, requiring that two-thirds of the
Texas Optometry Board be members of a state optometric association affili-
ated with the American Optometric Association, was upheld as a local eco-
nomic regulation rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The
decision respecting section 2.02 was appealed and affirmed. See note 14
supra.
28. While a brief discussion of several of the Supreme Court's commercial
speech cases serves as a background for a study of the Friedman decision, a
comprehensive analysis of the commercial speech doctrine is beyond the
scope of this note. The doctrine has been the subject of much criticism
elsewhere. See, e.g., Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment
Theory, 74 Nw. U.L REV. 372 (1979); Gardner, Free Speech in Public Places, 36
B.U. L. REv. 239 (1956); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
[Vol. 59:482
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speech, misleading or otherwise, was outside the scope of first
amendment protection.29 This notion, known as the "commercial
speech doctrine," is attributable to the Supreme Court opinion in
Valentine v. Chrestensen,30 a 1942 case. Chrestensen, who had
printed a handbill with a commercial advertisement on one side
and a political protest on the other, was restrained from handing it
out because New York City prohibited distribution of commercial
handbills on public streets. The Supreme Court unanimously up-
held the regulation,31 stating that although the states cannot un-
duly burden communication of information or opinion in the
streets, "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on govern-
ment as respects purely commercial advertising."32 The Court
gave no reason for the decision except that when commercial
speech is involved, regulation is for legislative, not judicial deter-
mination.33 Despite its failure to provide a clear definition of
"purely commercial advertising," or to supply either rationale or
authority to support its decision, the Court did imply that commer-
cial advertising, i.e., commercial speech, does not communicate in-
formation or ideas that the first amendment protects.
Supreme Court decisions after Chrestensen show that the prin-
ciple is not an inflexible doctrine, but a distinction allowing greater
regulation of commercial speech. Courts made every effort to
avoid categorizing speech as purely commercial. For instance, in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,34 the Supreme Court determined
429 (1971); Roberts, Toward a General Theory of Commercial Speech and the
First Amendment, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 115 (1979); Comment, The New
Commercial Speech Doctrine and Broadcast Advertising, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L
L. REV. 385 (1979); Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine: The First
Amendment at a Discount, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 60 (1974).
29. See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Developments
in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HAnv. L. REV. 1005, 1027 (1967).
30. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For a discussion of the Court's treatment of commercial
speech prior to Chrestensen, see Bayus, The Constitutional Status of Commer-
cial Expression, 3 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 761, 765-68 (1976); Gardner, supra
note 28, at 241-47.
31. The New York City ordinance held valid in Chrestensen was later found to be
an unconstitutional violation of the first amendment as an unreasonable reg-
ulation of protected commercial speech in People v. Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d 527,
355 N.E.2d 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1976) (decided after Virginia Bd. of Phar-
macy).
32. 316 U.S. at 54.
33. One member of the Chrestensen Court, Mr. Justice Douglas, later commented
that the "ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflec-
tion." Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas J., con-
curring). The decision has also been described as "one of those curious
judicial judgments which so often illustrate the psychology which accompa-
nies war." Gardner, supra note 28, at 239 (footnote omitted).
34. 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964).
1980]
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that speech is not rendered commerical merely because it relates
to an advertisement. In fact, since 1951,35 the Court has never
denied first amendment protection on the ground that the expres-
sion involved was purely commercial speech.36
The simplistic approach of Chrestensen was also avoided by the
Court in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations.37 In a five-four decision, the Court upheld an ordinance
prohibiting newspapers from listing employment advertisements
in columns according to whether male or female applicants were
sought. Though describing the advertisements as "classic exam-
ples of commercial speech, '38 the Court found that the restriction
imposed was permissible because the proposed discriminatory hir-
ings were themselves illegal. The Court suggested that regulation
of the advertising of legitimate commercial activity should be as-
sessed by balancing "[any First Amendment interests which
might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal"
against "the governmental interest supporting the regulation. '39
Although this suggested analysis is dictum, it clearly rejects the
view that all commercial speech is per se unprotected.
Two years after Pittsburgh Press, the Court again considered
the constitutional status of commercial speech, and moved even
further away from the distinction made in Chrestensen. Bigelow v.
Virginia4O held that a Virginia statute prohibiting the publication
or circulation of abortion advertisements was unconstitutional as
applied to a publisher who had advertised the availability of legal
abortions in another state. The advertisement was protected be-
cause it "did more than simply propose a commercial transaction.
It contained factual material of clear 'public interest'."'4 1 The pro-
tection to be afforded misleading or deceptive commercial speech
was not discussed in Bigelow, but the Court noted that even if the
advertisement had been claimed to be deceptive or fraudulent,
35. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (ordinance banning door-to-
door solicitation for purposes of sales upheld as applied to solictors of maga-
zine subscriptions).
36. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. at 759.
37. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
38. Id. at 385.
39. Id. at 389.
40. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
41. Id. at 822. In dictum, the Bigelow Court narrowly limited the Chrestensen
approach of resolving first amendment claims merely by categorizing the
speech as commercial: "Regardless of the particular label asserted by the
State ... a court may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment
interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served
by the regulation." Id. at 826.
[Vol. 59:482
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such a contention would have been unsupported by the record.42
Many commentators consider the Court's opinion in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council,
Inc.43 to have completed the demise of the commercial speech ex-
ception from first amendment protection.44 In this 1976 case, the
Court invalidated a Virginia statute which prohibited the adver-
tisement of prescription drug prices. After recognizing that
"[p Iurely factual matter of public interest may claim [first amend-
ment] protection,"45 the Court focused on the individual con-
sumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information and
noted this "interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate."4 6 The Court
then observed that "society also may have a strong interest in the
free flow of commercial information,"47 and "[e ] ven an individual
advertisement, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general
public interest."48
The Court, applying a first amendment balancing approach,
weighed these individual and societal interests against the prof-
fered justifications for the advertising ban4 9 and determined that
the commercial speech in this case was not "wholly outside the
protection of the First Amendment."50 The Court's opinion indi-
cates that purely commercial speech can no longer be summarily
dismissed as undeserving of first amendment protection; it is enti-
tled to the same balancing approach as noncommercial speech.
The decision in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, however, was not
without caveats. The Court noted that certain "commonsense dif-
42. Id. at 828.
43. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Comment, Commercial Speech and the Limits of Legal Advertising,
58 OR L. REV. 193, 193 (1979); Note, A Step Forward for the Consumer: A Con-
stitutional Right-to-Know in Prescription Drug Price Advertising, 13 URB. L.
ANN. 179, 185 & n.37 (1977); Note, The Demise of the Commercial Speech Doc-
trine and the Regulation of Professional's Advertising: The Virginia Pharma-
cy Case, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 245, 245 (1977); 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 67, 88
(1976); 9 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 295, 306 (1977-78). See also People v. Remeny,
supra note 31.
45. 425 U.S. at 762.
46. Id. at 763.
47. Id. at 764.
48. Id.
49. The justifications offered for upholding the advertising ban were based prin-
cipally on the necessity of maintaining a high degree of professionalism on
the part of licensed pharmacists. Id. at 766-69.
50. Id. at 761. The Court felt that to uphold the advertising restriction would be a
"highly paternalistic approach," id. at 770, not in the best interests of the indi-
vidual or society. "[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they
are well enough informed, and.., the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them." Id.
1980]
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ferences" 51 between commercial and other varieties of speech
might suggest that a different degree of protection be accorded
commercial speech. Because commercial speech is the sine qua
non of commercial profits, and therefore extremely durable, and
because it is also particularly susceptible to verification by its dis-
seminator, it may be less necessary to tolerate inaccurate state-
ments for fear of silencing the speaker.5 2 Furthermore, it may be
appropriate to require additional messages, warnings or disclaim-
ers so as to prevent deception.53 The Court also cautioned that
only truthful commercial speech is protected; a state is free to sup-
press false and misleading advertisements. 54 Finally, the Court
warned that it had considered only product advertising and that
the advertising of professional services might require special con-
sideration.55
Bates v. State Bar,5 6 decided only one year after Virginia Board
of Pharmacy, quickly brought the distinctions between profes-
sional services and product advertising squarely before the Court.
In Bates, the Court held that a ban on newspaper advertisements
containing information about the availability and costs of routine
legal services violated the first amendment guarantee of free
speech.57 The Court rejected the contention that the advertising of
attorneys' services was inherently misleading, 58 and specifically
51. Id. at 771 n.24.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 771-72. The Court stated.
Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been pro-
tected for its own sake .... Obviously, much commercial speech is
not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or mis-
leading. We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with
this problem. The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does
not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial
information flow cleanly as well as freely.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice
Stewart further emphasized that the first amendment does not protect false
or deceptive commercial speech. Id. at 777-81 (Stewart, J., concurring). For a
violent disagreement with the Court's position, see Jackson & Jeffries, Com-
mercial Speech" Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L.
REV. 1, 39-40 (1979).
The Court also noted that ordinances which suppress advertisements pro-
posing illegal activities, and reasonable restrictions on time, place and man-
ner of speech which were enacted without regard to advertising content
would be constitutional. 425 U.S. at 771-73.
55. 425 U.S. at 773 n.25. Accord, id. at 773-75 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
56. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
57. Id. at 384.
58. Id. at 372-75. The Arizona State Bar offered three reasons for this contention.
First, Arizona argued that legal services are not sufficiently standardized to
allow informed comparison. The Court acknowledged that many legal serv-
ices are unique in nature, but added that "it is doubtful that any attorney
[Vol. 59:482
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stated that it was not addressing advertising claims relating to the
quality of such services.59 While again holding that commercial
speech, which "serves individual and societal interests in assuring
informed and reliable decision-making,"6 0 is entitled to some first
amendment protection, the Court also repeated the same caveats
to its holding on commercial speech that it stated in Virginia
Board of Pharmacy.6 1 Regarding advertising that is claimed to be
deceptive or misleading, the Court recognized that "many of the
problems in defining the boundary between deceptive and
nondeceptive advertising remain to be resolved."62 These hazy
boundary lines were drawn into focus by the Court's opinion in
Friedman, where the issues of deceptive commercial speech were
directly before the Court.
IV. THE FRIEDMAN DECISION
The Court had little trouble categorizing the use of trade names
in optometry as a form of commercial speech,63 though the Court
would or could advertise fixed prices for services of that type." Id. at 372
(footnote omitted). In the Court's opinion, only routine legal services, such
as those advertised by Bates, would lend themselves readily to advertising,
and such advertisements would not be misleading as long as the necessary
work is done at the advertised price. Id. at 372-73. Second, Arizona argued
that attorney advertisements would be misleading because clients would not
know in advance just what services they required. The Court rejected this
contention by stating that the client would at least be able to "identify the
service he [desired] at the level of generality to which advertising lends it-
self." Id. at 374. Third, Arizona argued that advertising would mislead the
public by focusing on factors other than ability. The Court admitted that this
contention had some merit, but it concluded that the public should not be
denied available information merely because that information is incomplete.
Id. at 374-75. The Court also relied on Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 769-70, for the proposition
that the Court should "view as dubious any justification that is based on the
benefits of public ignorance." 433 U.S. at 375 (1977).
59. Id. at 383-84.
60. Id. at 364.
61. Id. at 383-84. See notes 51-55 & accompanying text supra. Since Bates, the
Court has continued to stress the notion that there are "commonsense differ-
ences" between commercial speech and other forms of speech by observing
that commercial speech occupies a "subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978)
(lawyer's freedom of speech not violated by state bar disciplinary action re-
sulting from his in-person solicitation of clients). This statement apparently
applies even to truthful commercial speech.
62. 433 U.S. at 384.
63. 440 U.S. at 11. The Court noted that the use of a trade name should be distin-
guished from the free discussion of governmental affairs and speech that
does more than simply propose a commercial transaction: "Such speech is
categorically different from the mere solicitation of patronage implicit in a
trade name." Id. at 11-12 n.10.
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did determine that the district court's reliance on Bates and Vir-
ginia Board of Pharmacy was misplaced 64 since trade names are a
significantly different form of commercial speech than the speech
considered in those cases.65 The difference, the Court explained,
was that trade names are a form of commercial speech possessing
"no intrinsic meaning. '66 The Court supported this finding with
the following assertions:
A trade name conveys no information about the price and nature of the
services offered by an optometrist until it acquires meaning over a period
of time by associations formed in the minds of the public between the
name and some standard of price or quality. Because these ill-defined as-
sociations of trade names with price and quality information can be
manipulated by the users of trade names, there is a significant possibility
that trade names will be used to mislead the public.
6
'
Stating that the possibilities for deception of the public were
numerous, the Court offered three examples:
[1] The trade name of an optometrical practice can remain unchanged de-
spite changes in the staff of optometrists upon whose skill and care the
public depends when it patronizes the practice. Thus, the public may be
attracted by a trade name that reflects the reputation of an optometrist no
longer associated with the practice. [2] A trade name frees an optometrist
from dependence on his personal reputation to attract clients, and even
allows him to assume a new trade name if negligence or misconduct casts
a shadow over the old one. [3] By using different trade names at shops
under his common ownership, an optometrist can give the public the false
impression of competition among the shops.
6 8
The Court also observed that a state may rationally wish to dis-
courage large-scale commercial practices in optometry while not
prohibiting the practice of commercial optometry altogether. A
trade name ban seeks to advance this state interest by hampering
the ease with which such establishments advertise.69
The above-mentioned deceptive and misleading trade name
practices were not based on speculation, said the Court, but on ac-
tual experiences with which the Texas legislature was familiar
when it enacted section 5.13(d). 7o The Court then referred to the
facts and opinion of a 1967 Texas Supreme Court decision, Texas
64. Id. at 8. Reviewing its decisions in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy and Bates, the
Court reiterated the individual and societal interests in the free flow of truth-
ful commercial information. Id. at 8-9. The Court then emphasized that in
those decisions it had specified certain permissible regulations on such
speech, including restrictions on deceptive and misleading commercial
speech. Id. at 9.
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id. The Court indicated that the protected commercial speech in Virginia
Board of Pharmacy and Bates was "self-contained and self-explanatory." Id.
67. Id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 13.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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State Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp,7 1 as dispositive of
the fact that optometrical trade names previously had been used to
deceive and mislead the public in Texas.7 2 The Court believed that
even if Rogers' use of his trade name was not in fact misleading to
the public, it was an example of the use of a trade name to facili-
tate the large-scale commercialization which enhances the oppor-
tunity for misleading practices.7 3
The Court concluded that the state's interest in protecting the
public from the deceptive and misleading use of optometrical trade
names was "substantial and well-demonstrated."7 4 In holding that
section 5.13(d) was a "constitutionally permissible state regulation
in furtherance of [that] interest, 7 5 the Court emphasized that its
holding had "only the most incidental effect on the content of the
commercial speech of Texas optometrists, 7 6 and that rather than
stifling commercial speech, section 5.13(d) ensures that commer-
cial information concerning optometrical services will "appear in
such a form ... as [is] necessary to prevent its being deceptive. 77
71. 412 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 389 U.S. 52 (1967).
Carp, a commercial optometrist, operated 71 optometry offices in Texas under
at least 10 different trade names. From time to time, the trade name at a
particular office was changed, although the licensed optometrists employed
in that office remained the same. Carp purchased the practices of other op-
tometrists and continued to operate these practices under their names, even
though they were no longer associated with the respective offices in any man-
ner. In several instances, different trade names were used on offices in close
proximity to one another which dispensed identical optical goods and serv-
ices. These offices were under a common supervisor and had a common staff
of optometrists, but the use of different trade names facilitated advertising
that gave the impression of competition among the offices. In light of this
evidence, the Texas Supreme Court found that Carp had used trade names to
give a misleading impression of competitive ownership and management of
his shops. Id. at 311-13.
The district court in Rogers v. Friedman distinguished Carp on three
grounds: (1) it did not deal with a constitutional question, (2) the trade
names in Carp were different in nature, and (3) Carp was decided prior to
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy and Bates. 438 F. Supp. at 430.
72. 440 U.S. at 14.
73. Id. at 15.
74. Id. (footnote omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 16. Since the factual information associated with a trade name may be
freely advertised by Texas optometrists, see note 27 supra, the Court rea-
soned that the trade name ban would not greatly hinder the practice of com-
mercial optometry. 440 U.S. at 16.
77. Id. (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 771 n.24) (bracketed portion added by the Court).
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V. ANALYSIS
A. The Underlying Assumptions
The Friedman decision actually breaks little new first amend-
ment ground. The Supreme Court merely followed and applied its
previously formulated model for commercial speech78 by filling in
the gaps left by prior cases. As with the other commercial speech
cases decided by the Court, Friedman should be read as a rather
narrow decision.79 Justice Powell recognized this fact in a footnote
to the opinion, referring to commercial speech as a "yet uncharted
area.,
80
The Court's decision was reached in a fairly straightforward
manner. It first recognized that commercial speech is entitled to
some measure of first amendment protection 8 ' and then deter-
78. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. at 770-73. Accord, Comment, supra note 28, at 390 n.31.
79. Accord, Farber, supra note 28, at 399.
80. 440 U.S. at 10-11 n.9. Justice Powell also stated: "When dealing with restric-
tions on commercial speech we frame our decisions narrowly." Id.
81. The exact extent to which commercial speech is protected by the first amend-
ment is uncertain since the concept of "freedom of commercial speech" is
just now emerging. The Court has stated that because of the peculiar hardi-
ness of commercial speech, regulations to insure truthfulness, to prevent de-
ception and to better inform the public will be permitted. The Court spoke on
the hardy nature of commercial speech in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, where it
said:
The truth of commercial speech ... may be more easily verified by
its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political commen-
tary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate informa-
tion about a specific product or service that he himself provides and
presumably knows more about than anyone else. Also, commercial
speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is
the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its
being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.
425 U.S. at 771 n.24. This rationale was also approved in Bates, 433 U.S. at 383,
and Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10.
Another reason for the lower level of protection afforded commercial
speech was suggested by the Court in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447 (1978). The Court stated:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a level-
ing process, of the force of the [first] Amendment's guarantee with
respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First
Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded com-
mercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,
while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in
the realm of noncommercial expression.
Id. at 456.
There is general disagreement as to whether commercial speech deserves
the protection of the first amendment. Some commentators advocate full or
increased protection for commercial speech, Gardner, supra note 28, at 250;
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mined that the use of trade names in connection with the practice
of optometry is a form of such speech. In determining the amount
of first amendment protection to be extended in Friedman, the key
finding was that trade names, as a form of commercial speech, may
be misleading.82 Once that finding was made, the Court merely
cited its ruling in Virginia Board of Pharmacy that misleading,
false or deceptive commercial speech may be regulated by the
state,83 noted that the state's interest in protecting the public from
deceptive and misleading optometrical trade names was substan-
tial and well-demonstrated, and upheld the constitutionality of
section 5.13(d). The Court stopped short of applying a first amend-
ment balancing of interests, since it believed that the misleading
nature of trade names removed them from the ambit of first
amendment protection. The dissent, noting that the Court has not
yet determined the degree of scrutiny required in such cases, was
highly critical of the Court for not balancing interests in Fried-
man.84
The Court admitted that commercial speech is not entitled to
the full measure of first amendment protection.85 Indeed, there ap-
pears to exist a presumption that once speech is recognized as
commercial, the "commonsense differences" between such speech
and fully protected speech justifies a variety of differences in treat-
ment.86 This subtle "presumption" is the fundamental error in the
Court's recently adopted approach to commercial speech. As a
matter of constitutional law, the underlying presumption should
be that the highest standard ought to apply. At the outset of any
Note, Yes, FTC, There is a Virginia: The Impact of Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. on the Federal Trade
Commission's Regulation of Misleading Advertising, 57 B.U. L. REV. 833, 862
(1977); while others would afford such speech no protection at all, Baker,
Commercial Speech. A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv. 1, 3
(1976); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into
the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 352-55 (1978);
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
27-28 (1971).
82. 440 U.S. at 12-15.
83. Id. at 16.
84. Id. at 20. The dissent was written by Mr. Justice Blackmun (who authored
the Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Bates decisions), with whom Mr. Jus-
tice Marshall joined. In Blackmun's opinion, the justifications offered by the
majority did not support a statute so sweeping as section 5.13(d). He consid-
ered trade names a "vital form of commercial speech," id. at 22 n.3, and stated
that "the First Amendment forbids the choice which Texas has made to shut
off entirely the flow of commercial information to consumers." Id. at 28.
85. Id. at 10 n.9.
86. The differences in treatment include denial of protection to misleading or de-
ceptive commercial speech and a refusal to apply the overbreadth doctrine in
the commercial speech area. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977).
1980]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
analysis, commercial speech should be presumed to deserve the
protection available to all favored speech.87 Less than complete
first amendment protection should be tolerated only when com-
mercial speech is determined to be of a sufficiently deceptive or
misleading nature. Although certainly not a desired approach, the
employment of different levels of first amendment protection in
the area of commercial speech may be painfully necessary because
of the unfortunate circumstances surrounding the historical devel-
opment of such speech by the Court.
Short of granting all commercial speech the same level of pro-
tection as political expression, any method of judicial analysis by
necessity includes the determination of whether the speech in
question is commercial in nature.88 The Court has been justly crit-
icized for failing to provide either a standard of review or a working
definition for commercial speech.89 Friedman will do little to quiet
such criticism, since the Court did not attempt to define commer-
cial speech but merely applied one of the commercial speech pro-
tection exceptions outlined in Virginia Board of Pharmacy.90
Supreme Court commentators have proposed several definitions
87. "Every expression is entitled to the same presumption that its regulation is
invalid." Comment, supra note 28, at 409.
88. In some instances, it is of great importance whether the speech in question is
found to be commercial or noncommercial. Speech which may contain false
statements would be afforded a quite different degree of first amendment pro-
tection depending on this determination. Noncommercial speech, even when
false, is generally entitled to substantial first amendment protection. The
Supreme Court has stated, when speaking in terms of noncommercial
speech, that "[tihe First Amendment requires that we protect some false-
hood in order to protect speech that matters." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974). False commercial speech, however, has only been
granted limited first amendment protection and may be subject to proper reg-
ulation.
89. See Canby & Gellhorn, Physician Advertising: The First Amendment and the
Sherman Act, 1978 DuKE L.J. 543, 552-54, Comment, Prior Restraints and Re-
strictions on Advertising After Virginia Pharmacy Board: The Commercial
Speech Doctrine Reformulated, 43 Mo. L. REV. 64, 71-83 (1978); Comment,
First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitu-
tional Doctrine, 205, 222-36 (1976); 9 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 295, 307-11 (1977-78).
Cf. Canby & Gellhorn, supra, at 558-60 (difficulties stem from lack of stan-
dards for misleading or deceptive advertisements); Knapp, Commercial
Speech, the Federal Trade Commission and the First Amendment, 9 MEM. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1978) (importance of definition of false and misleading
commercial speech). But see Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 54, at 1 (defini-
tion of commercial speech is reasonably settled).
90. See notes 51-55 & accompanying text supra. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in
Virginia Board of Pharmacy, was quite critical of the majority for its job of
line drawing with respect to false and misleading speech. He believed the
distinction between truthful commercial speech and false and misleading
commercial speech to be unmanageable. 425 U.S. at 787. See also Jackson &
Jeffries, supra note 54, at 38-40.
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for commercial speech, but perhaps the most viable is a scheme of
definition based on the contractual functions of such speech.9 1 Ap-
parently, since the Court did not provide a definition of commer-
cial speech in Friedman, it will continue to employ a case-by-case
analysis of commercial speech regulations. 92 If the Court were to
adopt a concrete definitional scheme for commercial speech analy-
ses, it would be a welcome relief to the ad hoe approach presently
employed.9 3
A particularly disturbing aspect of the Court's opinion is the
casual agreement of all nine justices that trade names, in particu-
lar the words "Texas State Optical," have "no intrinsic meaning."94
The Court states that initially, a trade name conveys no informa-
tion about the kind of services offered. Only after a trade name has
been in use for some period of time, and associations between the
trade name and some standard of price or quality have formed in
the minds of the public, does the Court consider it to convey infor-
mation.95 Yet certainly even a new consumer in Texas who knows
nothing about the Texas State Optical organization will find some
91. Farber, supra note 28, at 386-91. The critical factor in this approach is
whether a state rule regulating commercial speech is based on the informa-
tive function or the contractual function of the language. As long as a regula-
tion relates to the contractual function of the utterance, the regulation should
not be subjected to the intensive scrutiny required when a regulation directly
implicates the informative, first amendment function of language. The test
proposed by Farber to distinguish between regulations involving the informa-
tive aspect of advertising and those involving its contractual aspect is the test
offered by the Court in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for cases
in which "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same
course of conduct-
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it... furthers
an important or substantial government interest; if the government
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
Section 5.13(d), viewed in a contractual function framework, seems to be
directed at limiting the possibilities of misrepresentation. The Friedman
opinion indicates that the Court would be satisfied that the first two criteria
of the O'Brien test have been met, see 440 U.S. at 15-16, but the third criteria
is equally important, and the Court's analysis gave cursory attention to find-
ing a less restrictive means of regulating optometrist's trade names than the
complete prohibition of section 5.13(d). See 440 U.S. at 12 n.11.
92. See id. at 10 n.9.
93. See J. NowAN, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONsTImoNAL LAW 158-61 (Supp.
1979-80).
94. 440 U.S. at 12, 24.
95. This general proposition, that words are meaningless until they become asso-
ciated with concepts or things, is supported by linguistic authority. See A.
GARDINER, THE THEORY OF SPEECH AND LANGUAGE § 13, at 38 (2d ed. 1963); R.
HARRIS & J. JARRETr, LANGUAGE AND INFORMED LOGIC 87 (1958).
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meaning in the words "Texas State Optical." These words may not
trigger any specific price or quality associations, but they will con-
note a commercial organization operating in the State of Texas and
dealing in some manner with optical lenses or eyewear. The
Court's blanket statement that a trade name is "a form of commer-
cial speech that has no intrinsic meaning"9 6 is too broad. Perhaps
the Court recognized this when it immediately qualified the state-
ment by observing that over time, a trade name does acquire some
meaning.97 Although the Friedman Court was speaking only in
terms of professional trade names, it would be possible for a court,
keying on certain statements in the opinion, to extend the holding
to non-professional trade name usage. The "no intrinsic meaning"
statement by the Court should be viewed in a narrow sense and
cautiously approached as the standard for regulating the use of
trade names in future instances. 98
B. Trade Names May Mislead: The Court's Justifications
To support its declaration that there is a significant possibility
that trade names may be used to mislead the public, the Court
supplied several illustrations of such deception. Relying upon the
dangers of deception, the Court found that the state's interest in
trade names was substantial and well-demonstrated. These illus-
trations, or rather justifications, for the holding were in the form of
hypothetical misuses of trade names by optometrists and the relat-
ing of the facts and holding of a 1967 Texas Supreme Court case.9 9
Although stating that the possibilities for deception were nu-
merous, the Court provided only three examples of how such de-
ception could occur.100 First, it was proposed that since a trade
name does not tell the public the names of the practicing optome-
trists in an office, changes in the staff may occur without the pub-
lic's knowledge. Therefore the Court reasoned, the public may be
96. 440 U.S. at 12.
97. Id. In the law of trademarks and trade names, this concept is referred to as
"secondary meaning." See 87 C-J.S. Trade-marks, Trade-names, and Unfair
Competition § 90 (1954).
98. See note 80 supra. The Friedman ruling merely allows regulation of the use
of professional trade names in the face of substantial and well-demonstrated
state interests. In professions where a code of ethics is not promulgated by a
"professional" association and many years of training and education are not
required for licensing, the state may have a more difficult time finding sub-
stantial and well-demonstrated interests to justify such regulation. On the
other hand, with the demise of the emphasis on caveat emptor and increasing
consumer protection programs, the state may have little trouble supplying
such justifications.
99. Texas State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry v. Carp, 412 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 389 U.S. 52 (1967).
100. See note 68 & accompanying text supra.
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attracted by a trade name that reflects the reputation of an optom-
etrist no longer associated with that office.10 1 The dissent pointed
out, however, that any misleading of the public based on that justi-
fication could be readily remedied by merely requiring that the op-
tometrist's name be disclosed along with the trade name.10 2 If the
Court had held in such a manner, however, it undoubtedly would
have been widely criticized for judicial legislation. Modification of
section 5.13(d) to require simultaneous disclosure of an optome-
trist's name with the trade name would surely be a less drastic
means of discouraging deception, but such a determination is for
the Texas legislature to make. 0 3 Because such an approach would
certainly reduce the misleading nature of optometrical trade
names, a first amendment challenge to such a statute might at
least entitle commercial optometrists to a balancing of interests.
The second justification proposed for the determination that
trade names may be deceptive was that they serve to free an op-
tometrist from dependence on personal reputation. Allowing the
use of trade names, the Court reasoned, would permit a commer-
cial optometrist to assume a new trade name if negligence or mis-
conduct cast a shadow over a former trade name. This approach is
unrealistic. States should be encouraged to deal firmly with mem-
bers of professions who are negligent or engage in misconduct.
The Court cavalierly implies that the identity of a misbehaving op-
tometrist could be successfully hidden behind a trade name, both
from the public and the Texas Optometry Board, which is empow-
ered by the Texas Optometry Act to suspend optometrists for mis-
conduct and negligence. 1° 4 It is surprising to find that the Court
assumes that an optometrist who has been negligent or engaged in
101. Rogers argued that even if section 5.13(d) was to be considered a valid means
to prevent such deception, it was still unconstitutional as a violation of equal
protection because it did not apply to ophthalmologists and osteopaths. Brief
for Appellee at 33-35. The Court dismissed this contention by observing that
Rogers failed to produce any evidence to support it. 440 U.S. at 16 n.17. Cf. id.
at 15 n.14 (no proof that deception occurs under optometrical partnerships).
102. By disclosing his individual name along with his trade name, the
commercial optometrist acts in the spirit of our First Amendment ju-
risprudence, where traditionally "the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence." Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S., at 97, quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
440 U.S. at 25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
103. See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE
UJ. 464 (1969).
104. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4552 § 4.04(a) (2), (3) (Vernon 1976) provides:
(a) The board may, in its discretion, refuse to issue a license to any
applicant and may cancel, revoke or suspend the operation of any
license if it finds that-
(2) the applicant or licensee is guilty of any fraud, deceit, dishon-
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misconduct would still be practicing optometry under any name. 105
The third justification offered was that trade name usage allows
the false impression of competition by optometrical offices under
common ownership. This reasoning fails to stand up to a practical
analysis. It would be relatively easy for a common owner of sev-
eral optometrical offices (where the optometrists do not practice
under a trade name but under their own names as licensed) to por-
tray to the public a sense of competitiveness between such offices.
Trade names have nothing to do with the implication of competi-
tion. The public could be led to believe that the office of Dr. Smith
is in competition with the office of Dr. Jones without the use of
trade names, even though this impression of competition is errone-
ous. Even a statute requiring an optometrist to simultaneously
disclose his or her licensed name along with the trade name would
not alleviate this problem. Only a more conscientious policing of a
profession by its governing body (in this case the Texas Optome-
try Board) will reveal such deceptive conduct.
The Court found support for these three justifications in the
facts of Carp and the depositions provided the district court in
Rogers v. Friedman.0 6 The effect of the Court's justifications are
severely weakened, however, by a requirement that optometrists
simultaneously disclose their licensed names with their trade
names. The Court could have ordered such affirmative disclosures
and allowed section 5.13(d) to stand, but because the statute oper-
ated to "absolutely [prohibit] the dissemination of truthful infor-
mation about.., wholly legal commercial conduct to consumers
and a public who have a strong interest in hearing it, ' '107 a more
judicious approach would have been to find section 5.13(d) uncon-
stitutional and allow the Texas legislature the opportunity to mod-
ify it.108 This approach to commercial speech regulation was
esty, or misrepresentation in the practice of optometry or in his seek-
ing admission to such practice;
(3) the applicant or licensee is unfit or incompetent by reasons of
negligence.
105. Advertising Age, March 19, 1979, p. 16, col. 2. Cf. Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 768-69 (any
pharmacist guilty of misconduct would surely lose his license).
106. See 440 U.S. at 13-15 & 15 n.13.
107. Id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Comment, HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.,
supra note 28, at 398-99 n.71.
108. "fDeceptive or false advertising can be regulated by a state, but the state
must employ the least intrusive alternative." Roberts, supra note 28, at 148.
Friedman implies that the Court will not consider such an alternative re-
specting commercial speech, but prior appellate decisions indicate that in ad-
vertising cases such consideration is a necessity. See National Comm'n on
Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 164 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821
(1978); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 619 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 938 (1977). In Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 964, 972
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approved in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, when the Court stated
that it may be "appropriate to require that a commercial message
appear in such a form, or include such additional information...
as [is] necessary to prevent its being deceptive. 109
C. The Paternalistic Approach
The Court also advanced a fourth justification for upholding the
trade name prohibiton: the state may wish to discourage large-
scale commercial practices in optometry while not prohibiting the
practice of commercial optometry altogether. The Court reasoned
that because trade names facilitate the advertising essential to
such commercial practices, the state may regulate their use. At
the heart of this concept is the notion that a state may act to pro-
tect its citizens from the possibility of being misled by commercial
speech from such state-wide organizations. Critical of this ap-
proach and its "highly paternalistic" nature, the dissent pointed
out'1 0 that the Court had recently rejected it in First National
Bank v. Bellotti.111
Friedman also seems out of the mainstream with regard to the
recent national movement aimed at increasing consumer aware-
ness in the marketplace. 112 Since the stated purpose of section
5.13(d) is to "better enable members of the public to fix profes-
sional responsibility,""13 it seems rather contradictory to prohibit
the use of trade names, thus preventing the public from quickly
ascertaining whether an optometry office employs commercial
methods of practice. 1 4 The Court directly confronted this aspect
of commercial speech regulation in Virginia Board of Pharmacy
when it stated:
(7th Cir. 1979), petition for certfiled, 48 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1979) (No.
79-697), the court stated: "A remedy for deceptive advertising which is
broader than is necessary to prevent future deception ... is impermissible
under the First Amendment."
109. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (emphasis added).
110. 440 U.S. at 26.
111. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (state statute prohibiting bank from publicizing its view on
the merits of a proposed state constitutional amendment held unconstitu-
tional).
112. E.g., 16 C.F.R § 456 (1979) (rule preempting state laws which prohibit or bur-
den the advertising of prescription eyewear or eye examinations); 16 C.F.R.
§ 409.1 (1979) (rule designating affirmative disclosures designed to give con-
sumers information about the durability of light bulbs). Contra, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1335 (1976) (prohibition on the advertising of cigarettes or little cigars on
any medium of electronic communication).
113. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552 § 5.13(a) (Vernon 1976).
114. Appellant State of Texas concedes that "[t]he practice of optometry in Texas
under a trade name is more than just a means of identification, it connotes an
entire manner of practicing optometry." Brief for Appellant State of Texas at
18.
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There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach.
That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful,
that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the chan-
nels of communication rather than to close them.
1 1 5
If the Court's presumption that trade names are misleading in
nature must be accepted, perhaps a balancing of interests would
be appropriate to determine a less restrictive alternative than the
complete suppression of section 5.13(d). 116 Trade names by their
very nature simplify, and any simplification contains an element of
potential deception. A trade name should not be condemned per
se merely because it is capable of deceiving someone. That is but
one segment of the scale; it may or may not outweigh the interest
of other individuals in receiving the information contained in the
trade name-an interest that should be thrown into the balance as
well. But in Friedman no interests are weighed. The balancing
approach was not needed once the Court decided optometrical
trade names had the possibility of being misleading and deceptive.
Even before the Court took commercial speech into the first
amendment's protective fold, governmental remedies for deceptive
trade name usage were invalidated if found to go further than nec-
essary to eliminate the deception.1 17 FTC v. Royal Milling Co. 118
illustrates this point. At issue was the validity of FTC orders for-
bidding the use of certain trade names the agency had found de-
ceptive. Although it sustained the Commission's findings that the
names in question were misleading, the Supreme Court neverthe-
less held that the remedial orders were improper. The Court
stated:
[T] he commission went too far in ordering what amounts to a suppression
of the trade names. These names have long been in use .... They consti-
tute valuable business assets in the nature of good will, the destruction of
which probably would be highly injurious and should not be ordered if
less drastic means will accomplish the same result. The orders should go
no further than is reasonably necessary to correct the evil ... and this can
be done ... by requiring proper qualifying words to be used in immediate
connection with the [trade] names. 19
115. 425 U.S. at 770.
116. See Comment, supra note 28, at 395; Comment, The Commercial Speech Doc-
trine and the First Amendment, 12 TULSA L. Rsv. 699, 722-23 (1977). But cf.
Gard, The Absoluteness of the First Amendment, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1053, 1054-55
(1979) ("balancing" not a proper test for fundamental analyses involving the
first amendment).
117. Jacob Siegal Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S.
212 (1933). Cf. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 983 (1977) (FTC cannot prescribe a remedy that goes further than is
necessary in order to eliminate deceptive advertising).
118. 288 U.S. 212 (1933).
119. Id. at 217.
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The majority in Friedman casually distinguished Royal Milling
because it arose from a fifth amendment property interest dispute
and not the first amendment, 120 but the Court offered no policy jus-
tification for such a distinction. 12 1
The effect of upholding the constitutionality of section 5.13(d) is
to prevent the public from immediately perceiving the commercial
nature of an optometry practice, a factor which may be important
to some consumers. The Court discussed no alternatives to the
complete suppression of the use of optometrical trade names,
since it was believed that they were unprotected misleading com-
mercial speech. In evaluating regulations upon commercial
120. The Court stated:
[A] property interest in a means of communication does not enlarge
or diminish the First Amendment protection of that communication.
Accordingly, there is no First Amendment rule, comparable to the
limitation on [the FTC], requiring a State to allow deceptive or mis-
leading commercial speech whenever the publication of additional
information can clarify or offset the effects of the spurious communi-
cation.
440 U.S. at 12 n.11.
121. See id. at 25 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court apparently believed
there was no need to consider the issue, since Rogers made no claim that he
was being deprived of his property without due process of law. Id. at 12 n.11.
One commentator was extremely critical of the Court's comparison of
property and speech rights in Friedman. Comment, supra note 28, at 477
n.401. It was stated that the lack of a first amendment rule comparable to that
applied to the Federal Trade Commission was
plainly a non sequitur. At minimum, Jacob Siegel and Royal Milling
stand for the proposition that commercial speech, even without a
first amendment interest, should be subjected to narrowly drawn
regulation only. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), recognized the first amend-
ment interest that the Court so blithely ignored in footnote [eleven]
of Friedman. The Court must therefore explain how Virginia Phar-
macy, by conferring a first amendment interest, resulted in less pro-
tection for trade names.
Id.
This constitutional clash between property and speech rights had been
the subject of a federal district court case decided just three weeks prior to
Friedman. In Sambo's of Ohio, Inc. v. City Council, 466 F. Supp. 177 (N.D.
Ohio 1979), the city of Toledo attempted to prohibit the use of the trade name
"Sambo's" (a registered trademark) on the basis that it was offensive. The
court stated that the facts clearly "do not bring [this case] within those ex-
ceptions to the First Amendment guarantees such as ... fraudulent or de-
ceptive statements," id. at 179, and held that Sambo's was entitled to
declaratory and injunctive relief insuring its freedom to use its trade
name/trademark.
This case may be distinguished from Friedman by recognizing that in
Sambo's, the court was dealing with a registered trademark rather than a
trade name. See note 13 supra. The district judge's opinion in Sambo's also
illustrates the confusion that can occur when the same words are employed
by a firm as both a trademark and a trade name.
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speech, the Court will apparently continue to employ the all-or-
nothing approach adopted in Virginia Board of Pharmacy: "the
choice among . . . alternative approaches is not ours to make or
the [legislature's]. It is precisely this kind of choice, beween the
dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse
if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us."'1 22
D. The Friedman Impact
The range of state and self-imposed regulation permitted pro-
fessionals is currently undergoing reexamination. In light of past
restrictive practices that prevented virtually all professional adver-
tising under the guise of protecting the public-even though the
restraint also clearly protected monopoly interests and prevented
effective competition-this reconsideration is long overdue. The
effect of the Friedman decision is to give legitimacy to state and
professional codes of responsibility that prohibit the use of as-
sumed names, corporate names or trade names by professionals.
The advertising of the price and availability of routine services by
professionals is still allowable of course, but if such advertising is
potentially deceptive or misleading, it may be regulated or prohib-
ited.
After the Friedman decision, lawyers were immediately appre-
hensive that the ruling would apply to those attorneys practicing
under a trade name.123 These concerns proved to be well-founded
in at least one state. Less than three months after the Court's deci-
122. 425 U.S. at 770.
123. See 65 A.B.A.J. 514 (1979); Klement, Lawyers Wary of Bar To Trade-Name
Use, NAT'L L.J., March 5, 1979, at 2, col. 3.
A disciplinary rule promulgated by the American Bar Association pro-
vides:
A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name, a
name that is misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers
practicing under such name, or a firm name containing names other
than those of one or more of the lawyers in the firm, except that....
if otherwise lawful a firm may use as, or continue to include in, its
name the name or names of one or more deceased or retired mem-
bers of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of suc-
cession.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIrrY, CANONS, DR 2-102(B) (as
amended 1976) (footnote omitted).
By allowing the continued use of deceased or retired attorney's names in
firm names, the rule seems to contradict its original command, but the ABA
justified this anomaly in a 1945 opinion. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETH-
ics, OPniONS, No. 267 (1945). The opinion explained that over time, the com-
bined efforts of law firm partners contribute to the goodwill of their firm
name, and "[iIn the case of a firm having widespread connections, this good-
will is disturbed by a change in firm name every time a name partner dies."
Id. at 555. This change results in some loss of goodwill to the surviving part-
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sion, the Court of Appeals of Maryland relied directly on the Fried-
man rationale in In re Oldtowne Legal Clinic, P.A. 124 to uphold a
prohibition on the use of trade names by lawyers. The trade name
ban contained in the Maryland State Bar Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility 125 was held to be a permissible restriction on poten-
tially deceptive and misleading commercial speech. The court
rejected an argument that physicians were under no similar re-
straints regarding the use of trade names by concluding that the
equal protection clause does not require that different professions
be treated in the same manner since different ethical considera-
tions govern law and medicine.126 Although Oldtowne extends
Friedman to encompass attorneys, the use of ethical considera-
tions as a distinction by the court should serve to limit the scope of
application of Friedman to other professions. 2 7 Friedman arose
on peculiar facts, and its implications should be drawn as narrowly
as possible.
VI. CONCLUSION
Friedman indicates that the protection exception for possibly
deceptive or misleading commercial speech is now firmly en-
trenched in the Supreme Court's model of the first amendment. In
fact, the decision has already been cited approvingly in several fed-
eral courts for that proposition. 28 Also indicative of this notion is
ners, who had helped to build it up over the years. To avoid this goodwill
loss, the opinion stated that the old firm name should be allowed to continue.
This reasoning appears directly contrary to the Friedman rationale. The
potential for deception is just as great for a prospective client seeking legal
services from a firm whose name partners have departed the firm by death or
retirement as for a prospective customer seeking optometry services from an
optometry office using a trade name.
124. 285 Md. 132, 400 A.2d 1111 (1979).
125. The Maryland Bar trade name ban is identical to DR 2-102(B). See note 123
supra.
126. Historical and functional differences between professions have also been rec-
ognized as important considerations in extending commercial speech hold-
ings inter-professionally. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 773 n.25.
An indication that physicians were also concerned about the implications
of the possible extension of Friedman to other professions is illustrated by
the attention afforded Friedman and Oldtowne in Tim CITATION, a publica-
tion of the American Medical Association. 39 THE CITATION 37 (1979); 40 THE
CrrATION 14 (1979).
127. By noting that the ethical consideration governing a profession are an impor-
tant factor in any extension of the Friedman rationale, the Maryland court
has certainly offered firm justification for the complete exemption of non-pro-
fessionals from a Friedman-type ruling. But see notes 98 & 101 supra.
128. Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244, 1252 (2d Cir. 1979), petition for cert. de-
nied, 100 S. Ct. 481 (1979); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F.
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the Court's memorandum decision in Century 21 Real Estate Corp.
v. Nevada Real Estate Advisory Commission129 announced shortly
after Friedman. In Century 21, the Court affirmed the holding of
the district court that a regulation requiring franchised real estate
brokers to display their names as prominently as their franchisors'
in all advertisements did not violate the first amendment in view of
the state's substantial interest in keeping false or misleading ad-
vertising from consumers.130
It is conceded that the government has the power to regulate
misleading or deceptive commercial speech, but a determination
that trade names fall within those categories should be reexam-
ined. Trade names provide information to the consumer, and the
state has a moral duty to encourage the free flow of such informa-
tion. The justifications offered by the Friedman Court for uphold-
ing the statutory prohibition of the use of trade names in
optometry simply do not stand up under a practical analysis. As
Mr. Justice Blackmun noted in dissent, "[a] trade name will
deceive only if it is used in a misleading context."' 3 1 The major-
ity's ruling in Friedman however, results in the presumption that
trade names are deceptive or misleading.
The Court's effort in Friedman to preserve the status quo in the
professions represents a setback to other branches of government
which had been seeking more efficient methods for delivering
costly services to consumers. It should be noted however, that the
Court in Friedman was merely holding that states or professional
associations are not precluded by the federal Constitution from
imposing trade name restrictions. There is nothing in the Court's
decision that would require a state or association to impose the
restriction on trade name usage. 132
James L. Young '81
Supp. 1072, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Wall & Ochs, Inc. v. Hicks, 469 F. Supp. 873,
880 (E.D.N.C. 1979).
129. 440 U.S. 941 (1979).
130. In reaching its decision, the court stated: "We cannot agree that a least re-
strictive alternative applies to regulations which are designed to combat mis-
leading or deceptive practices and which in no way threaten the commercial
message with complete or total suppression." 448 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (D. Nev.
1978) (footnote omitted).
131. 440 U.S. at 24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132. 65 A.B.A.J. 514 (1979).
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